I'm reading Jared Diamond's excellent book Collapse (you know it's important when it has its own Wikipedia page!), which devotes a whole section to the real sociopolitical dangers modern China faces as a result of environmental fragility and degradation. I rather serendipitously happened upon this article in The Economist, which discusses developments therein (both good and bad) since Collapse was published in 2005:
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-green-energy-its-rise-will-have
I subsequently ended up thinking a lot about the subject, so I thought I'd muse about it in prose. (Sometimes -- very occasionally -- I miss writing essays for college history classes...) This post is rather long, so I've put it below the cut:
Much has been made in recent news of China's atrocious air quality, and rightly so. The thick smog blanketing many of the country's major metropoles endangers the health and shortens the lifespans of millions of Chinese. China also has significant water pollution and soil erosion problems -- not to mention the hundreds of endangered species within its borders that face extinction within our lifetimes. The common (and often accurate) perception, especially among Westerners but increasingly among China's own citizenry as well, is that the government and large corporations in China care more about profits and living standards than they do about public health and safety or about the environment. Since so many Chinese are still very poor (China is not yet a First World country, after all), such priorities are shortsighted but not necessarily illogical; as the article notes, many of the world's developed countries were terrible polluters during their own Industrial Revolutions, and only after they had increased the standard of living did they begin to worry about sustainability and conservation. China, despite the very real damage it is currently inflicting upon the planet, feels justified in industrializing in environmentally unfriendly ways because everyone else did it too (albeit decades and centuries ago).
China knows, however, that it needs to invest in the environment to ensure that the country remains stable and prosperous in the future. (There was recently another article in The Economist discussing the correlation between climate change and civil conflict.) Conservationist measures may cut into profits in the short term, but are ultimately essential to sustaining its huge population in the long term. Diamond would find the situation analogous to that of, say, farmers who raise sheep in Australia, as they rely on the same tract of grazing land to sustain their flocks for generations. These shepherds voluntarily keep their flocks smaller than the land's maximum carrying capacity, to prevent overgrazing and ensure that there will be healthy soil and sufficient vegetation in years to come. Similarly, China knows -- hopes -- that the current political structure isn't going to disappear anytime soon. Future generations of Chinese, including the descendants of today's rich and powerful, will have to live off the same land that the current population now inhabits. In order to leave their descendants a viable, stable country (i.e. a land without famine, chronic water shortages, depletion of arable land, skyrocketing fuel prices, unbreathable air, &c.), today's leaders need to make sure that China's current usage of its natural resources is sustainable and does not irreversibly damage the environment. It's quite like how emperors of centuries past tried, by and large, to leave their heirs a strong empire; dynasties usually fell after several generations of rule by the same family, after which the reigning emperor had no personal recollection of what it took to claim the throne in the first place, and so he squandered his resources through some combination of stupidity, laziness, complacency, and prioritization of short-term gain over long-term stability -- at which point his dynasty was ousted, and a new (and hopefully wiser) steward of the land came to power. This is a fate that modern China hopes very much to avoid.
As the above article notes, China, armed with a knowledge of history and of the experiences of the industrialized countries that underwent their own industrial revolutions decades (or even centuries) ago, has a distinct advantage over much of the First World in implementing environmental policy. That is, China as a nation has the capacity to overcome the tragedy of the commons in a way that few other countries can match, because it isn't a democracy. (See, for example, China's extremely effective population control measures -- though of course, the One Child Policy came with a number of unintended consequences that the country will have to contend with in the coming decades.) The other way of avoiding the tragedy of the commons (the first being the long-term, intergenerational sense of investment and ownership cited above) is by strictly regulating the use of shared resources. In China, there aren't any voters with disparate, often competing (short term) interests who can vote their leaders out of office if they enact policy that sacrifices immediate gain for future rewards. China doesn't have to wait until a technology becomes economically viable before mandating its adoption, because even though the country is leaning further towards capitalism than ever before, it still retains many significant characteristics of its state-controlled economy. We all know the horror stories of dictatorship at its worst, and certainly China is not exempt from such dangers (see its history in the later Mao years), but on the other end of the spectrum of absolutism is Plato's philosopher king, an unrealistic ideal that a non-democratic, paternalistic state can nonetheless aspire towards. Such involved, long-term planning as a comprehensive environmental policy requires plays to the strengths of a monolithic one-party state.
Officials that don't need to cater to voters might seem, at first, to be also immune to special interest groups, but of course the truth is more complicated. Big business tends to have, in large and concentrated quantities, what individual voters do not -- money. This enables it to undermine the central government's policies at more local levels by instigating various forms of corruption, or even to chip away at them more quietly (and legally), by creating financial incentives for local governments to turn a blind eye to practices that might violate national environmental laws. Even though citizens in China are growing increasingly aware of, and concerned about, environmental damage -- especially as it affects their air quality, their drinking water, their food -- they have less immediate clout than a large corporation does, because they don't vote and their freedom of speech is still significantly curtailed. Therefore, the behaviour of policymakers is dependent more on their own self-interest (personal and genetic) and their beliefs and goals regarding governance than on any body of constituents. The most heartening aspect of this assessment is that officials aren't immune to the effects of environmental degradation -- they breath the same smoggy Beijing air as the average citizen does -- which gives them very selfish, but effective, motivation to do something about it. As Jared Diamond noted, the upper classes of a society are to an extent insulated from the effects of a failing ecosystem, but they don't live in completely isolated gated communities, however much they might wish or believe that they do. Environmental collapse affects everyone; the wealthy and powerful have merely bought themselves (or rather, their descendants) the dubious privilege of being the last to die. Environmentally friendly policy depends upon the political elite's awareness of this fact -- of which China's officials have increasingly taken note.
China has another advantage, though. Its industrial revolution -- its climb from third world to first world country -- is taking place at a time when green technology is making its way, slowly but surely, into mainstream energy consumption. In much of China, new infrastructure is being built where it did not exist before, as opposed to existing infrastructure being updated or supplanted. Such areas are a blank slate, as it were, and can implement the latest in green construction the first time, instead of having to dismantle or retrofit dirty infrastructure to mitigate or improve its environmental impacts. A good analogy would be that of phone service in much of Africa. Much of the continent (with the exception of countries bordering the Mediterranean) is still desperately impoverished, often unstable, and difficult to access, as it is covered in dense jungle. Landlines would be prohibitively expensive to implement -- hence, populations in sub-Saharan Africa have been acquiring mobile phones, leapfrogging over landline technology, because cellphones require much less infrastructure. Certain types of mobile technology -- mobile banking, for instance, or healthcare monitoring -- have developed and caught on in the Third World before they've made much headway in developed countries, because they don't have to overcome the inertia of previously entrenched systems. The same concept applies in the field of green construction; China therefore has the opportunity to make without unmaking, as it were, to get it right (or as close thereto as possible) the first time.
All in all, I'm optimistic -- cautiously optimistic, as Jared Diamond might put it. I've seen some of these developments first-hand, in the times I've been to China -- both the terrible air quality and the newly-implemented green infrastructure. I haven't been back in a few years, but I've been told that more people are paying attention to environmental impacts. Here's to hoping they're the right people (the people with the power to do something about it -- the politicians and CEOs -- as opposed to the 老百姓).
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